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Chapter 21.
The Ultimate End of Faith (Part 2)
In general, Japanese and Shinshu people were ethical,
but it was largely a passive ethic, prudential in nature in the face of
social problems. In the past five centuries of Shinshu there have been
varying theories on the connection of this principle of "Two
truths, absolute and conventional." The view of Akamatsu, outlined
by Fugen Daien in his "Shinshu Gairon," is that they have an inevitable
interrelation (Sohatsusetsu) or mutual emergence. In this view,
conventional morality is held to be contained in the absolute truth. A
second theory, also outlined by Fugen Daien, holds that essentially the
realm of absolute truth refers to the transfer of merit of faith whereas
the conventional realm refers to the principles derived from rational
reflection. In this, the content of the conventional truth is that of
Confucian morality with its five cardinal virtues, combining the five
relationships of filial piety and the five cardinal Confucian virtues of
justice, politeness, wisdom, fidelity, and benevolence. In this view,
morality is impregnated with faith, but their sources differ. In his
analysis, Fugen tends to accept the second view as more adequate, since
if morality is totally a product of faith, then there is no way to
account for the morality of the unbeliever. However, faith may make
morality stronger through its influence, even though morality is derived
from rational reflection.
In his "Introduction to Shin Buddhism," Kosho Yamamoto
states the mutual relation of the two spheres of truth:
"To clarify the relation between 'religion'
and 'moral,' the Shinshuist of modern ages has brought about
the so-called teaching of 'shinzoku-nitai,' i.e., the 'Two truths of True and Secular.' By
'true' is meant
the Way of Truth, which is what concerns emancipation from 'dukkha,' i.e., life's
'sorrow.' By 'secular' is meant what
concerns the Way of Life. It is said that these two gates are to go as
the wheels of a vehicle. This is to say, the failure of one cripples the
other, hence jeopardizing the faculty of the whole.
If we view this in the light of the traditional meaning of secular truth
(as embodying Confucian morality and following the Imperial Law), the
standard of religion ultimately becomes whether or not that religion is
a fulfillment of the individual's citizenship role. One's religion is
thus evaluated on the basis of whether it makes one a good citizen and
the essential nature of religion is subsumed under social obligation. In
the history of Japan, persecution of Pure Land Buddhism was based on
this point. The teachings of Honen, and of his pupil Shinran, as well as
that of their contemporary Nichiren, were intolerable to the Kamakura
Imperial regime because they challenged this standard and broke
communality in their profession of a deeper meaning in religious truth."
From another aspect we can see that in periods when
the control of the society over the individual was total, the secular
standard of political conformity for religion does have the virtue of
offering an area where faith can be free -- albeit at the expense of not
disturbing the social order. Such a formulation of isolated limited
freedom of faith contrasts with our democratic modern standpoint in
which free faith is indistinguishable from freedom of action. The
limited freedom of the traditional secular standard does not spell out
precisely what faith adds to the action of achieving justice and
benevolence in society, or how faith deals with situations of oppression
and exploitation in a society beyond acceptance or even resignation.
Shinshu theologians frequently identify the practice
of gratitude with morality, yet the full thrust of Shinran's morality
was obstructed during the period of nationalism when the principle of
two truths was interpreted to conform to the priority of the Imperial
Law. In his analysis of Shin Buddhism, Prof. Futaba sharply
questions the relationship between the faith that is the practice of
gratitude and morality. He calls attention to the thought of Manshi
Kiyozawa, who saw morality as indispensable for the perfecting of
humanity and ourselves, but a morality not of social conformity but of
definition by faith alone. For Futaba, the stance provided by Shinran
for approaching the ethical life was the principle "believing
oneself, teach others to believe" (Jishinkyoninshin). It is in this
principle that we see demonstrated the critical thrust of Shinran's
thought, piercing the false, hypocritical "good" of society
and religion in his day.
Although Shinshu traditionalists still may define the
practice of morality as the expression of gratitude, such has seldom
been the case. Instead, under the impact of Japanese social history, the
principle of morality as the expression of gratitude more often meant
uncritical subservience to the reigning ethic. The boundless freedom of
Jodo Shinshu was thus obscured during much of the Tokugawa and Meiji
eras and, indeed, Buddhism as an acceptable set of rites for funerals
and memorial services with few exceptions supplanted the original focus
of Shinran and his Kamakura contemporaries on Buddhism as the very way
and meaning of life itself. It is this element of Shinran's critical
insight into religion and society that must be recovered if the true
meaning of his potential is to be made effective in the modern world. As
Prof. Futaba says:
"Whatever occupations all the successive followers of
Shinran participate in, is it not imperative that they must reject
becoming virtuous in the world of political power but in the end must
focus on (the principle of jishinkyoninshin (to teach others the faith
one holds oneself). Should not the people of the world accept Shinran's
standpoint that, within the conflict of enormous political powers which
have grown like monsters, the only moral path is jishinkyoninshin, as a
society of non-authoritarian believers.
"The belief in material things and political authority
reveals that a primitive faith in the gods pervades modern times. It is
regarded as rational, intelligent, and something that brings a world to
fruition, something strong on which we can rely. However, it is clear
that its history is false and absurd. The standpoint of faith which
brushes aside a self-power mentality and rejects belief in gods is the
only way which people must seek through their lives confronting the
delusions of history even in the modern age. [2]
In the light of the collapse of traditional moralities
East and West, Shin thought offers a new approach to the relationship of
faith, and action. In our present period, belief in objective structures
of morality has weakened if not collapsed. We have too often seen such
structures manipulated and applied in the interests of special classes
and groups. In a world which cannot guarantee the validity of one's
ideals through some supernatural or cosmic guarantee, contemporary
people have been given the responsibility to establish ethical existence
from within themselves. In this context, Shinran's religious
perspective, with its roots in deep inward transformation and
commitment, become an important resource for considering contemporary
issues. We would not be attempting to discover the precise content of
Shinran's ethical outlook in terms of specific do's and don'ts (although
some are present in his writings). Rather, we can try to discover the
basic underlying principles that govern his perspective.
For that reason, we have directed attention to
Shinran's statements on "Sage Path" and "Pure Land
compassion," as recorded by Yuienbo in "Tannisho," IV:
"In the matter of compassion, the Path of Sages and the
Pure Land path differ. Compassion in the Path of Sages is to pity,
sympathize with, and care for beings. But the desire to save others from
suffering is vastly difficult to fulfill.
"Compassion in the Pure Land path lies in saying the
Name, quickly attaining Buddhahood, and freely benefiting sentient
beings with a heart of great love and great compassion. In our present
lives, it is hard to carry out the desire to aid others however much
love and tenderness we may feel; hence such compassion always falls
short of fulfillment. Only the saying of the Name manifests the heart of
great compassion that is replete and thoroughgoing. Thus were his
words." [3]
This passage might be titled the limit of
compassion,
when brought into relation with Shinran's understanding of karma, his
experience of the futility of reciting sutras on the road to Inada, and
when viewed also in relation to Shinran's concept of
neither-priest-nor-layman. It yields insight into the context for his
ethical thought. The point of this passage seems very clear, in that the
Sage path approach to compassion and its attempt to help beings falls
short of its own goal. As limited beings in the world, we cannot
generate sufficient power on our own to effect the release of all.
Shinran discovered this for himself when on the road to Inada, he vowed
to save all beings through reciting the thousand parts of the three Pure
Land sutras. Realizing that this effort was futile, he abandoned the
practice. It was again the situation he met when striving for his own
salvation by trying to build a bridge to infinity from the narrow basis
of his own strength and intention.
In Chapter XIII of "Tannisho" there appears an interesting
discussion of the role of karma in determining action, in which Yuienbo
quotes Shinran as saying:
"Remember that no evil is ever done, that does not
originate from a past karma, be it so minute as a grain of dust on the
point of a hair of a lamb or rabbit." [4]
Shinran here appeals to the reality and strength of
karma which places us in this life and directs our actions in this
world. Nothing we do can be done unless there is the karmic basis for
it. Hence, from that side of existence, we are utterly powerless to act
on our own as though we were totally autonomous beings. In contemplating
his relation to other beings, and his efforts to save them, the utter
limitation of being able to do anything on his own was Shinran's basic
realization. This was his way of facing his historical reality which, as
with the later myokonin, heightened his sense of imperfection and sin.
Through this historical reality which bounds our lives, we become aware
of deeper forces at work which strive to save us and all other beings.
This is the faith in Buddha's compassion which has no superior power to
compete with it, and which cannot be obstructed by any evil. Therefore,
in the Pure Land faith the goal is to become Buddha and, by uniting with
that power of compassion which we call Amida Buddha, to attain the
salvation of all beings.
Despite the futuristic element of Pure Land, which
places this attainment in another life, there is built into such a faith
a guard against despair as to either our own capacities or the results
which may be achieved through our limited efforts. Shinran, while
indicating the limits of human action, does not reject action as such
and it is in this way that he reaches out to the despairing, alienated
men and women of today. He understands that we will be moved to act
through compassion. We may have aspirations and hopes, but he cautions
against expectations. Such a viewpoint goes against much of contemporary
ideas of "thinking big," but its realism is quite evident when
one considers the failure of the many movements for social changes in
our time. In countless cases, the participants have had too high
expectations and when they failed to reach their goal, they turned on
society and those about them with bitterness. They sought escapes and
dropped out. Many also perceived they needed a deeper understanding of
reality and frequently joined extreme religious movements.
By contrast, Shinran's way sets the direction for
ethical action by providing a realistic assessment of the possibilities
of human effort in a world such as ours and with people like ourselves.
When we understand his idea of "poisoned good," we see that a
major concern he had was to purge religion of egoism; that is, to place
religious action in a context where the act would be spontaneous and not
tinged with egoism. His concept of neither-priest-nor-layman also
attests to this view. Our actions are not to proceed from the
traditionally understood religious motivations to create merit and gain
enlightenment for ourselves, which is the priestly approach, nor merely
for the maintenance of social order, which is the responsibility of the
layman. For Shinran, action must proceed from the realm beyond, which he
terms the realm of no calculation or contrivance, from the realm where
working is no working. It is the supernal realm of Jinen honi, of Buddha
nature, of the Unimpeded Infinite Light, a realm beyond shape or
definition, a realm symbolized in the compassion of Amida Buddha as
depicted in the sutras.
What does such a basis mean for ethic and ego? In his
effort to avoid the possibility of arrogant presumption on the part of
his disciples, Shinran cast this participation in the ultimate nature of
compassion into the future -- after our birth in the Pure Land. We can
never believe that we fully realize that ethic, even though we may
understand that we are sustained by the power of the Vow itself. Over
against our efforts to work ceaselessly for the good of our brothers in
the light of the Vow of Amida without discrimination or being
judgmental, we are illumined by the power of that Vow, and aware of our
egoism, sinfulness and desire for power and fame (Takuwa, in his "Perfect Freedom in
Buddhism," pp. 89-99).
Shinran's definition of compassion is thus not meant
to inhibit ethical action of an outgoing, positive type, but to instill
in such ethical action a sense of deep limitations with respect to our
capabilities, our intentions, our prospects. While this view may well
induce a passivity in face of a well-established social order which
limits any criticism or efforts for change, I do not believe Shinran
would have entirely condoned subservience to the status quo. He was
himself able to make judgments concerning the justice and righteousness
of the society which exiled his teacher Honen, his fellow students, and
himself. He could not fight back on that society's political terms, and
he probably did not desire to do so. His motivation went far deeper and
he continued in exile, despite government prohibitions, to propagate the
teaching of the Pure Land way.
In cases when his followers faced
persecution, he did not counsel that they merely be servile to the
state, but in the interests of the further progress of the teaching to
be more sensitive to their actions and the social implications of their
actions. Thus, he advised not to despise the gods and Buddhas of
traditional communal religion, but to regard them as manifestations of
Amida and therefore essentially benefactors. He counseled against
useless arguments which created hatred, and urged that believers
practice their faith quietly. He advised also that his followers should
have aspirations for the welfare of society in general, for when there
is peace and tranquility, the conditions are better for the spread of
the teaching. His stance toward society was not one of acquiescence to
the status quo, but one which viewed the situation from a higher plane
and attempted to act in harmony with that plane.
To fully comprehend this essential dimension of
Shinran, we must emphasize, particularly as exemplified in chapter IV of
"Tannisho," that the important point is non-egoistic action, action which
is not an instrument merely for advancing the self but which is action
that reveals the compassion of the Buddha. This perception supplies a
major consideration in determining in our own time what actions are
appropriate to a Shin Buddhist. I believe that one important
determination would be -- what does that action do to bring meaning into
other people's lives? Rather than the Shin Buddhist's focus being on the
meaning of his or her own life (which may under these conditions seem
not to have meaning), we may consider how meaningful our actions are in
the lives of others -- all in light of the boundedness of our lives.
For Shinran, the directive influence in determining
one's moral activity must be Buddhism. As illustration of this, in
chapter V, "Tannisho," Shinran makes a statement which is truly remarkable
in view of the nature of the importance of filial piety in his time:
"I, Shinran, have never invoked the Nembutsu even once
in the feeling of filial piety for my parents. All sentient beings have
been, and will be at one time or another, our fathers, or mothers,
brothers, or sisters in the course of transmigration. So, we, after
becoming Buddha in our next life, should save each one of them."
While we might agree with Shin scholars that in this
passage Shinran is not advocating disrespect of parents, but actually
perhaps even a broadening of filial obligation to all beings, the fact
remains that from traditional Confucian viewpoints (which were also
promoted in Buddhism through its memorial services), society is based on
graded love. One's parents and family have a greater claim on one's duty
than have the broader masses of people. This was an ancient issue
between Confucianists and the advocates of Universal Love, such as Mo ti
in ancient China. Buddhists in China argued that they fulfilled filial
piety through services on behalf of departed ancestors. Yet Shinran,
guided by his own understanding of Buddhist universality and his
awareness of absolute Other Power, confessed that he never performed
such Nembutsu.
In reality, he is saying that there is nothing special
about his parents over against all other beings, and in this life he is
in any case powerless. He does concede to human sentiment, however, that
when one has become a Buddha, this statement hardly displaces the earlier, since he has already stated
that everyone at some point is mother and father to us. It is only the
last in succession that would qualify for special treatment? It is
difficult to reconcile Buddhism universalism and Confucian hierarchy at
this point. We must, I believe, accept Shinran's personal re-direction
of ancient Japanese social morality.
The discussion of the ultimate end of faith has led us from the
consideration of issues pertaining to the afterlife and human destiny to
ethical issues rooted in this life. The problem of afterlife and the
challenge of this life are in healthy tension in Shin thought. The
charge of other worldliness is misplaced. While there are instinctual
and important concerns for afterlife which we all face as mortal beings,
the center of gravity of Shinran's thought lies in this life because of
the deep confidence and assurance we have that Amida has embraced us
never to abandon and the Vow covers all times and space. With destiny
assured, life can be lived with meaning and dedication, with hope and
courage.
Multiple Choice Questions
1. According to Kosho Yamamoto, the Shinshuist of
modern ages has brought about the so-called teaching of shinzoku-nitai,
or "Two Truths of True and Secular," for the purpose of:
a) clarifying the relationship between
"religion" and "morality" b) showing that there is no relationship between religious truth and
morality c) demonstrating that link between morality and good
citizenship
2. For Shinran, the salvation of all beings could only
be attained by:
a) pitying and caring for beings b) reciting sutras that would generate enough merit to save all
beings c) saying the Name and quickly attaining Buddhahood
3. How does Shinran's thought set the direction for
ethical action? By:
a) encouraging us to "think big" in
bringing about social change b) providing a realistic assessment of the possibilities of human
effort in a world such as ours c) instructing us that no such actions are possible since everything is
ego-motivated 4. In Chapter V, "Tannisho," Shinran states that he has
"never invoked the Nembutsu even once in the feeling of filial
piety for my (his) parents." What is Shinran actually saying? That:
a) family is not important b) filial piety is a
delusion c) there is nothing special about his parents over
against all other beings
Thought Questions
1. What is your understanding of the relationship
between religion and morality?
2. The author thinks that Shinran's religious
perspective can be an important resource in dealing with contemporary
ethical/moral issues. Find an issue that concerns you and try to apply
Shinran's perspective to it. What do you find? What problems do you
encounter?
3. Today, as in the past, there are people who are
attempting to bring about social change. While Shinran's stance toward
society was not one of acquiescence to the status quo, he did urge his
followers to constantly question their own motivations for such action
and to be sensitive to their actions and the social implications they
might have. How can such an approach benefit us today?
Bibliography
Bloom, Alfred: "Tannisho: Resource for Modern Living"
Notes
[1] Kosho Yamamoto, "Introduction to Shin Buddhism," pp.
172-73 [2] Shinran no Kenkyu, pp. 364-65 [3] Dennis Hirota, tr.,
"Tannisho: A Primer," p. 24 [4] Ryukyo Fujimoto
translation
[5] Ryukyo Fujimoto translation.
[6] Ryukyo Fujimoto translation |
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